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SEC has not expressly set forth the degree of disclosure required. A
1945 opinion issued by the director of the SEC Division of Trading
and Exchanges indicates that only a full disclosure of a potential
conflict of interest will suffice.5" The SEC, pursuant to section 206 (4),
has issued a "statement of policy" for "specifying certain types of
representations, charts, implications and omissions which are con-
sidered materially misleading in the selling literature of investment
companies."'" This statement of policy indicates that only a full dis-
closure of any potential conflicts will be sufficient to satisfy the statu-
tory mandates. Full disclosure in light of Capital Gains would appar-
ently include the date the security in question was acquired and pos-
sibly the size of any position held or to be taken in a recommended
stock, and would especially include any intent to change that posi-
tion in the near future. Such disclosure may, however, amount to
actual prohibition of such practices because client reaction to this
disclosure may be too painful a burden for the investment adviser
to bear.
Carl W. McKinzie
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce:
The Current Status
I. THE JUDICIAL QUAGMIRE
The increasing demand for additional state revenue is responsible
for a marked growth in both the type and amount of state taxes.'
This growth has included the imposition of income taxes on inter-
" 11 Fed. Reg. 10997 (1945), 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 56374 (opinion of Director
of Trading and Exchange Division, relating to section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, section 77q(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and sections 78j(b) and 78o(c) (1)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
"It follows that an investment adviser may not effect a transaction as principal with a
client unless he obtains the client's consent to the transaction after fully disclosing any
adverse interest he may have, together with any other information in his possession which
the client should possess in order to determine whether he should enter into the transaction."
11 Fed. Reg. at 10997, 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 5 56375. (Emphasis added.)
59 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (1961), 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 56382 (Advertise-
ments by Investment Advisers).
'Hartman, Slate Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 Va.
L. Rev. 1051 (1960).
Because of the new and expanding conceptions as to what a government
should do for its people, the problem of an effective coordination of taxes
has been greatly accentuated in recent years. While demands for additional
governmental services continue to pyramid, inflation has spiralled governmental
costs. State tax collections have not kept pace with state expenditures which
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state business.! During the past century state taxation of income
derived solely from interstate commerce has been a source of judicial
conflict and confusion! Congress provided no legislative standards
to govern or limit this type of taxation," and the myriad of judicial
opinions' has only served to create further confusion in this area.'
The judicial state of affairs concerning taxation of interstate com-
merce was aptly described in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland as follows:
"Our decisions are not always clear ...consistent or reconcilable. A
few have been specifically overruled, while others no longer fully
represent the present state of the law."' In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has "handed down some three hundred full-dress
opinions ' on this particular problem only to create what has been
judicially described as a "quagmire."' The "quagmire" is not com-
pletely devoid of defenders, however. Mr. Justice Whittaker expresses
himself as follows: "The Court refers to our past opinions . . . as
creating a 'quagmire.' . . . I respectfully submit that this Court's past
opinions, rightly understood and aligned in their proper categories,
are remarkably consistent in a field so varied and complex."'" Despite
Mr. Justice Whittaker's protestations of consistency, it is generally
accepted that no workable rules for the imposition of such taxes can
be derived from the judicial maze that has evolved."
have soared over four hundred per cent in less than fifteen years. In truth,
in the overall picture, state governments currently appear to be operating
"in the red." Id. at 1052.
2 In 1911 Wisconsin became the first state to adopt a corporation net income tax.
By 1960 thirty-six states and the District of Columbia had followed suit. Of this number
fourteen states were either collecting, or under their laws had the ability to collect,
income taxes from out-of-state businesses engaged solely in soliciting orders within the
taxing state. As sample statutes see: Ga. Code Ann. §§ 92-3102, 92-3112 (1961); and
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.03 (1962). The fourteen states are: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, and Virginia.
'See Dowling, Introduction-State Taxation of Multistate Business, 18 Ohio St. L.J. 3
(1957); Hellerstein & Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 Harv. L. Rev.
949 (1941); Kust, State Taxation of Income From Interstate Commerce: New Dimensions
of an Old Problem, 14 Sw. L.J. 1 (1960).
4 There was a lack of any congressional regulation in this area until 1959 although the
courts were literally flooded with cases on the subject. See the history of the problem as
set out in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
'See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888).
'For conflicting views see Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952);
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307
(1938); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
7347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954).
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
9 Ibid.
"
5Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 485 (1959)
(dissenting opinion).
"i Mr. Justice Frankfurter states this best in his dissent to the Northwestern case. 358
U.S. 450, 476 (1959).
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II. THE NORTHWESTERN DECISION
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota" and its
companion case, William v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc." seemed
finally to establish sufficient guide lines for the imposition of state
taxes. 4 In Northwestern the dispute involved a Minnesota tax which
specifically covered corporations engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce. The taxpayer corporation maintained an office in Minne-
sota staffed by three persons. It solicited orders which were subject to
acceptance at the central plant in Iowa. In the Williams case the tax-
payer, a Delaware corporation with its principal office in Alabama,
maintained an office in Georgia which employed two people. Again,
the orders were subject to acceptance by the main office outside of
Georgia. The Supreme Court stated: "[N]et income from the inter-
state operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state
taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory [vis-a-vis local busi-
nesses] and is properly apportioned to local activities within the tax-
ing state forming sufficient nexus to support the same.""' This de-
cision held that "neither the commerce clause nor the due process
clause of the federal constitution denies to a state the power to levy
an apportioned, nondiscriminatory excise tax on the net income of a
foreign corporation, even though the income is derived exclusively
from interstate commerce."'" This case apparently left the states free
to impose a net income tax on foreign companies having a sufficient
nexus with the taxing state, if these taxes were nondiscriminatory
and fairly apportioned.
III. PUBLIC LAW 86-272
Six and one half months after the Northwestern case was decided,
12358 U.S. 450 (1959).
1"358 U.S. 450 (1959).
14 There were predictions mistakenly made that the Northwestern decision was a final
solution to the problem. Note, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 904. "[lt seems unlikely that Congress
will impose limitations on state taxing power in the near future." Id. at 920. The Wall
Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1959, p. 2, reported that the general reaction in Washington to
the decision indicated that Congress would not interfere with the right of states to tax
corporate income. Congressman Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, said
that it would be difficult at this time to get a drive going in Congress to change the ruling.
"s 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959).
'6 Hartman, supra note 1, at 1051. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Northwestern,
referred to the inadequacy of the court to deal with the problem and suggested congressional
action. "Congress alone can provide for a full and thorough canvassing of the multitudinous
and intricate factors which compose the problem of the taxing freedom of the states and
the needed limits on such state taxing power." 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959). See also McCarroll
v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188 (1940).
The states were quick to realize the possibility of increased revenue due to the North-
western decision and several either passed new tax statutes or amended the old. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 65-222.1 (Supp. 1959); Va. Code Ann. § 58-128 (1960).
[Vol. 19
Congress, in response to the protests of the business community,
passed legislation severely restricting the effect of that decision." The
Senate Finance Committee report on this matter cites the North-
western decision as the specific reason for such legislation."8 The
Committee's primary objection to this type of taxation was not any
discrimination or inherent unfairness in the taxes but rather their
"complexity."'" A leading authority predicted this problem: "The
major difficulty in state taxation of property and net income of far-
flung transportation and industrial enterprises is that of allocating to
each state its fair share of the national total. No factor and no com-
bination of factors can guarantee accurate allotments."'" The busi-
ness community expressed dissatisfaction with the high cost of com-
plying with the widely dissimilar standards and rates among the states.
The burden of making the proper determination of the tax due each
of the states appears to be the main reason for the prompt passage of
this legislation."'
As a result of these hearings and reports, the committee found that
enactment of a federal statute setting minimum standards for the
imposition of state net income taxes on income derived solely from
interstate commerce was essential to prevent an undue burden on the
free flow of interstate commerce. Public Law 86-272 was the result."1
1
7 Northwestern was decided February 24, 1959 and Public Law 86-272 was approved
September 14, 1959. Hellerstein, An Academician's View of State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 16 Tax L. Rev. 159 (1960). "The celerity of the Congressional response to
the pressures of business interests to restrict state taxation is even more striking in the
light of one hundred years of indifference and inaction by Congress while constant litiga-
tion flooded the courts over the controversies arising in the area of state taxation of inter-
state commerce." Id. at 160. Mr. Hellerstein also called the law "the hasty response by
Congress to the vociferous pressure of business men." Id. at 159.
"8S. Rep. No. 658, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1959): "These bills and the joint resolution
deal with the problem arising by reason of a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. Stockham Valves
& Fittings, Inc."
'9S. Rep. No. 658, supra note 18, at 4.
"Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation 202 (1956). For an
earlier statement along similar lines, see Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority
by the Taxing Powers of the States, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 634, 639 (1919).
" S. Rep. No. 658, supra note 18 at 3: The "burden of compliance . . . in ascertain-
ing . . . 'taxable income' . . . and the portion of the company's total taxable income that
is properly apportioned to the taxing state," appears to be the prime reason for the necessity
of prompt action in this area.
"73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. IV, 1963). See also: Hearings Before
Senate Committee on Small Business on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 86th Cong.
1st Sess. (1959); Hearings Before the Senate Committee On Finance On State Taxation Of
Interstate Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. Rep. No. 658, 86th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1959). For a very complete and clear review of the legislative history of Public Law 86-272
see Mickey & Mickum, Congressional Regulation of State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
38 N.C.L. Rev. 119, 124-29 (1959).
The pertinent sections of Public Law 86-272 provide as follows:
§ 101 Imposition of Net Income Tax-Minimum Standards
(a) No state, or pglitical subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for
any taxable year ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on
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This act prohibits the taxation of income from interstate commerce
if the only business activity in the state is the solicitation of orders
for the purchase of tangible personal property. To avoid taxation by
the state these orders must be sent out of the state for approval, and
if approved, be filled by shipment from a point outside the state. The
effect of this statute is greater than might be first expected because
of the widespread use of traveling salesmen or missionary men.
The situation was complicated further when shortly after the
passage of Public Law 86-272, the Supreme Court decided Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson." In Scripto, the Court held that an out-of-state busi-
ness could be required to collect and pay over a use tax' on sales
made within the taxing state although the business maintained no
facilities in the state. Public Law 86-272 offered absolutely no pro-
tection against a use tax as opposed to an income tax. Thus, by the
relatively simple process of changing income taxes into use taxes, the
states could avoid the effect of the statute altogether. However, by
forcing a change in the form of the state tax, the statute accomplished
its avowed purpose, i.e., to eliminate the complexity of the various
state income taxes.2
IV. THE REPORT
Public Law 86-272 was not intended as a final solution to the
problem." "Both Houses [of Congress] viewed this provision as a
temporary measure designed to hold the line pending the completion
of the thorough study which was considered necessary to achieve a
income derived within such state by any person from interstate commerce
if the only business activities within such state by or on behalf of such person
during such taxable year are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such
state for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside
the state for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or
delivery from a point outside the state; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such
state in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such per-
son, if orders by such customer to such person to enable such customer to
fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders described in para-
graph (1).
23262 U.S. 207 (1960).
" Use taxes are usually levied upon the use, storage or consumption of tangible personal
property purchased outside the taxing state but subsequently employed therein. These
taxes are similar in many respects to sales taxes. See Annot., 129 A.L.R. 217 (1940).
2 A use tax would be much less complex than the present maze of income taxes in
that, like its brother the sales tax, it is based on the purchase price of the article. This
eliminates the grave computation problem that arises under an income tax because there is
no need for a method of apportioning costs among the states. The sales price itself serves as
the amount to be taxed.
2 Staff of Subcomm. on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, House Comm. on the
Judiciary, Slate Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., 438 (1964): "Public Law 86-272 was enacted as stopgap legislation to forestall what
was viewed as a possible expansion of the taxing jurisdiction of the states."
NOTES
permanent solution."" Such a study was authorized by the act itself."
On June 15, 1964, the House of Representatives' Special Subcom-
mittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Committee
on the Judiciary completed the study authorized by Public Law
86-272."' The study encompasses two volumes, and the detailed
analysis of its complex statistical data goes far beyond the scope of
this Note. However, the report does seem to reach several very clear
conclusions:
1. the present system of state taxation of interstate commerce
is characterized by diversity and complexity and results in
substantial inequities;
2. there is widespread noncompliance with the present state and
local tax provisions in this area;
3. the cost of compliance is at least partially responsible for this
noncompliance;
4. the judicial process is inadequate to deal with this problem
and arrive at a final solution; and
5. Public Law 86-272 has achieved some degree of success as a
"stopgap" measure, but Congress must seek a more compre-
hensive and permanent solution.
The report refers to the existing state regulations and statutes as "the
product of a nonobjective artist,"'" and then continues: "[S]impli-
fication in the multistate tax system, through reduction of its multi-
plicity, variety, and mutability, is a necessary preliminary to achieving
a reasonable level of compliance with tolerable cost levels."'" The re-
port concludes: "Certainly, the problems presented are not easy prob-
lems, but they are important problems. They are important to the
states, and they are important to the vitality of the American com-
mon market. Congress has a responsibility to both, and it is time for
it to seek a solution."3' 2
V. THE RECENT CASES
In spite of the urging of the House Report, it is impossible to
predict the action that Congress will take or the time it will require
to act. Hence, Public Law 86-272 is of continuing current impor-
tance. The first cases testing and construing it have now been de-
271 id. at 8.
28 Title 1I of the act authorized the study to be made by the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate,
for the purpose of recommending legislation to provide uniform standards.
2"H.R. Rep. 1480, supra note 26.
"0Id. at 594.
S1Id. at 384.
l Id. at 599.
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cided. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled on its constitutionality in
International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham." International Shoe brought an
action against the Louisiana Collector of Revenue to recover state
income taxes that were paid under protest. International Shoe main-
tained that Public Law 86-272 prohibited the state from taxing
income obtained by sending salesmen into the state to solicit orders
to be shipped in interstate commerce. The Collector of Revenue
asserted that "Congress did not have the power to adopt Public Law
86-272"' 4 and maintained "that it [Congress] was without authority
to prohibit the states from levying taxes for their support under the
guise of regulating interstate commerce.""5 Nineteen states filed briefs
amici curiae supporting the Louisiana Collector, and several trade
associations filed briefs supporting International Shoe. The state
supreme court held the law constitutional, concluding that "the
statute in question is a proper exercise of the plenary power of
Congress over commerce and that the State law must yield insofar as
it is sought to be applied to the activities" 6 there involved.
A second case, decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, CIBA
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'r"' has also considered Public
Law 86-272. There the taxpayer had home offices in New Jersey and
employed resident salesmen in Missouri. All orders were sent to New
Jersey for approval, and when approved the goods were shipped in
interstate commerce. The State Tax Commission maintained that
Public Law 86-272 was unconstitutional, but the court agreed with
International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham referring to it as a "well con-
sidered opinion."3 A problem of interpretation arose because the Tax
Commission asserted that even if Public Law 86-272 is constitutional
the drug manufacturer's activities do not come within the minimum
standards prescribed. The Commissioner stated: "No court cases or
legal authorities have been found by this writer which can be of
any substantial aid in deciding what Public Law 86-272 actually
means and whether respondent's activities in Missouri come within
the statutory minimum or not." 8 The court had no difficulty, how-
ever, in finding that CIBA's activities were within the standards
prescribed by the statute.
These decisions by no means settle the dispute over Public Law
83 164 So. 2d 314 (La. 1964), cert. denied sub. nom. Mouton v. International Shoe Co.,
379 U.S. 902 (1964).4 Id. at 317.
8' Ibid.381 id. at 322.
'7382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964).




86-272. A recent Oregon tax court decision, Smith, Kline, and
French Laboratories v. State Tax Comm'n ° reached exactly the op-
posite result. That court relied on a direct-indirect distinction in hold-
ing the act unconstitutional, asserting that a tax on income derived
from interstate commerce as in Northwestern is valid.41 On the other
hand, the court maintained that a tax on the privilege of doing inter-
state business, as in Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor," is invalid.
International Shoe expressly disregards such reasoning as being un-
important.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress, in considering further legislation, should keep the prob-
lem they are attempting to solve clearly in mind. The two primary
aspects of the problem seem to be the multiplicity of systems among
the states and the high cost of compliance caused by the difculty of
a different method of calculation for each state. It has never been
contended that these state taxes are a problem because of their
amount. The real problem is not how much the states tax, but rather
the fact that they each have their own method of taxing. Therein
lies the real failing of Public Law 86-272. This statute has the effect
of exempting certain activities from state taxation, but this does not
alleviate the burden on those businesses not exempt. The admitted
cause of the problem-multiplicity of systems-remains entirely un-
affected.
The ultimate solution appears obvious. All states should use the
same method of calculation. The means to this end are not so obvious,
however. Congress cannot pass uniform tax statutes for each of the
states." It is submitted, however, that this solution can be achieved
4o 32 U.S.L. Week 2616 (Ore. Tax Ct. 1964). The decision states: "[T]his court is
not persuaded by the contrary result reached by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Cocreham." Ibid.
" An old line of decisions based the validity of state taxes on interstate commerce on
a distinction between direct and indirect taxes. Indirect taxes, such as a tax on net income,
were held valid while direct taxes, such as a tax on gross income, were held invalid. See
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); U.S. Glue Co. v. Town
of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918). This direct-indirect test should be distinguished from
the distinction between direct and indirect burdens on interstate commerce as illustrated
by Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). The direct-indirect burden on commerce test was later overruled
by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
42340 U.S. 602 (1951). In Spector the court held a franchise tax on the privilege
of doing interstate business to be direct and hence invalid. See also note 41 supra.
"2 The fact that interstate commerce is at the heart of the problem makes broad powers
available to Congress, but even these broad commerce powers appear insufficient to force
state legislators to pass specific tax statutes. Admittedly there is a theoretical problem of the
extent of federal power over commerce involved here and the outcome is not entirely
settled. The method suggested in the text would avoid this thorny problem. See Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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by a slightly more circuitous route. The proposed legislation should
take the form, not of an exempting statute, but rather of a declara-
tion that Congress has found all methods of taxing interstate com-
merce are an undue burden on that commerce except for one method
set out in the act.
It is not necessary, in fact not even desirable, that Congress set a
suggested or required maximum on the percentage of the tax. As
illustrated by Scripto," exempting an activity from net income taxes
may only invite the states to impose a sales or use tax. But it is im-
portant to remember that a sales or use tax does not present the
complexity inherent in income taxes. 5 The tax is a fixed percentage
of a sales price that is immediately known. Although the rate may
vary from state to state, the method remains the same and calcula-
tion is easily made. By analogy, the rate an individual state chooses
to set as an income tax rate should be immaterial so long as there is
a single method of computation applicable to all states.
The most difficult problem lies in apportioning a large multistate
business's net income among the several states where sales are made."6
The difficulties raised in attributing a particular expense or deduc-
tion to one state rather than another make it apparent that calcu-
lating an exact net income for each state may well be impossible.
However, each individual business would certainly have the per cent
of total gross income attributable to each state available in the form
of total sales figures. This percentage of gross income could then be
applied to the total net income figure of the concern as entered on
the concern's federal income tax return. This would provide a net
figure for the state in question which would then be taxed at that
state's rate.
Certainly there are many practical difficulties involved in this
method. The variance of overhead in relation to income depending to
some degree on the state where business is done would work some
injustice. 7 But when taken in view of a total economy, consisting of
" Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). See text accompanying note 23 supra.
45 See note 25 supra.
46 Mr. Justice Clark in Northwestern States Portland Cement v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959), speaking of double taxation in relation to the apportionment problem has the
following to say: "Logically it is impossible, when the tax is fairly apportioned, to have
the same income taxed twice. In practical operation, however, apportionment formulas being
what they are, the possibility of the contrary is not foreclosed, especially by levies in
domiciliary states." Id. at 462. See also Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
" This injustice could arise in the instance of an industry which had relatively large
costs in one state and comparatively low costs in another state, but which derived approxi-
mately equal incomes from both states. In such a situation the business would pay the
same tax in each state although the operations in the state with low costs proved profitable
and operations in the state with high costs resulted in a loss. A striking example of this
would be the operations of General Motors in Michigan.
At present, there is a definite discrimination in favor of manufacturing states. The
